University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

Supervised Undergraduate Student Research
and Creative Work

5-2011

A Survey of Modern Mathematical Cryptology
Kenneth Jacobs
The University of Tennessee, ken.s.jacobs@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj
Part of the Algebra Commons

Recommended Citation
Jacobs, Kenneth, "A Survey of Modern Mathematical Cryptology" (2011). Chancellor’s Honors Program
Projects.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1406

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student
Research and Creative Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research
and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

Survey of Modern Mathematical Cryptology
Kenneth Jacobs
April 15, 2011
Abstract
Much of modern applied mathematics, and in particular modern applied algebra,
has focused on creating algorithms by which two parties can securely communicate
information. Numerous such algorithms have been published in the past thirty years;
some have been shown as insecure whereas others have withstood scrutiny for many
years. A class of these algorithms, known as key agreement protocols, are of particular
importance because of their utility in secure, rapid encryption. In this paper, we will
explore some of the ideas behind some public-key cryptosystems; in particular, we will
analyze an algorithm that was proposed in [2].
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Background

Cryptology is the study of ways in which two parties can securely communicate information.
Over the past century, the advent and rapid growth of digital communication has led to
mathematical algorithms for ensuring the security of encrypted messages. The practice
of encoding messages, however, dates back nearly as far as does written communication;
Egyptians, Romans, and feudal lords have used methods to keep their correspondence secret.
The most recent developments in cryptology mark a significant departure from the traditional
methods of encoding messages, and seem to offer higher levels of security.
In the cryptosystems considered here, an encryption algorithm is a map e : A × K → A,
where A is a set called an alphabet, and K is a set called the keyspace. A decryption algorithm
(relative to e) is a map d : A × K → A, where the alphabet and keyspace are the same as
for e. Further, for each key k1 ∈ K, there must exist k2 ∈ K satisfying d(e(x, k1 ), k2 ) = x.
The collection (A, K, e, d) forms a cryptosystem.
A very simple example of this is the affine cryptosystem; let A = F d , K be the set
GLd (F )×F d , and define a map ea : F d ×K → F d by ea (x, (K, k)) = Kx+k. The decryption
algorithm relative to ea is given da (x, (K −1 , K −1 k)); it satisfies da (ea (x, (K, k)), (K −1 , K −1 k)) =
x. Note that in the affine system, a person wishing to decrypt a message must know the same
information as the person who encrypted the message. For this reason, the affine cipher is
called a symmetric cryptosystem.
Definition 1 (Symmetric Cryptosystem). A cryptosystem in which they key k1 used for
encryption and the key k2 used for decryption are known to both communicating parties.
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Examples of symmetric cryptosystems are the Caesar Shift cipher from the Roman empire, the Viginère cipher, and the ciphers produced by the Enigma machines from the Second
World War. When implementing these or other symmetric cryptosystems, the two communicating parties need a way by which they can establish a common key, and this process
becomes one of the most important aspects of secure encryption. Simply using the same key
for each encrypted message allows an eavesdropper to employ crypto-analytic techniques
such as frequency analysis to determine the key and decrypt the secure communication.
Even recycling a few keys on some sort of pattern does not afford a high level of security.
What is necessary is for two parties to have a secure way to create a key that they can
use in their encryption and decryption. Now, if the two parties must meet and agree upon a
key for each time they wish to communicate, then they might as well share whatever secret
message they have to share in such meetings; therefore, the typical assumption is that the
symmetric keys must be created ’on-the-fly’. Of course, they cannot use symmetric ciphers
with pre-determined keys to create such keys, since there is no particular advantage to using
one cipher to create a key for another cipher other than simply layering the overall cryptosystem; even layered systems are subject to similar crypto-analytic techniques mentioned
above.
In the ideal situation, then, the two communicating parties would be able to create a key
without using some other symmetric protocol. This leads to the notion of an asymmetric
key agreement protocol; in these protocols, each of the communicating parties have some
piece of private information and share some public information.
Definition 2 (Asymmetric Key Agreement Protocol). Let A and B be parties wishing to
establish a symmetric key; let K1 be a key known only to A and K2 a key known only to B.
Let K be all other public information shared between these two parties. Then an algorithm
by which A and B can compute a common value K ∗ using the public information K and
their respective private information is called an aysmmetric key agreement protocol.
Using their private data and the available public data, each party is able to agree upon
a key that can then be used in a symmetric cryptosystem. Perhaps an example will be
illustrative.
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Example of Asymmetric Protocol

Let’s consider the group G = Z19 − {0}, the invertible elements of the finite field with 19
elements. All calculations and values will be in this field.
Suppose that two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to develop a key to use in a symmetric
encryption protocol, but are unable to meet in person to agree upon a key. Alice initiates the
protocol by declaring a random element, say q = 5 ∈ Z19 , to the public, perhaps publishing
it on an internet blog.
Alice’s Private Information:

Public Information:
field = Z1 9
q=5
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Bob’s Private Information:

When Bob and Alice decide to communicate, they each choose an integer to serve as
their private information; we’ll suppose that Alice chooses a = 17 while Bob chooses b = 30.
Alice’s Private Information:
a=17

Public Information:
field = Z1 9
q=5

Bob’s Private Information:
b=30

Alice now uses the public information and her private information to compute her public
key, Ka = 517 (mod 19) = 4(mod 19); this is published to the public. Likewise, Bob computes
and publishes Kb = 530 (mod 19) = 11.
Alice’s Private Information:
a=17

Public Information:
field = Z1 9
q=5
Ka = 4
Kb = 11

Bob’s Private Information:
b=31

Alice now computes (Kb )a (mod 19) = 1117 (mod 19) = 7(mod 19) and Bob computes
(Ka )b (mod 19) = 430 (mod 19) = 7(mod 19); note that Alice and Bob have arrived at the
same element of Z19 , which becomes their shared key that they can then use in a symmetric
protocol.
One immediate question arises: why it is necessary to utilize such a protocol only for
creating a key and not for communicating a message? An answer to this question is that it
is often much easier to implement symmetric protocols rather than asymmetric protocols;
therefore, the former are preferred for communicating long messages whereas the latter
are preferred for quickly creating keys to use in symmetric protocols. Since the key that
two parties are using in each symmetric encryption changes with each message, traditional
techniques such as frequency analysis are no longer reliable methods for decoding encrypted
communications.
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Modern Protocols and Algorithms

Note that, in the above protocol, in order to compute the shared key K, it would be sufficient
for an eavesdropper to know either Alice’s secret key a or Bob’s secret key b; thus, the
security of this protocol depends on the difficulty finding these numbers based on the public
information. In particular, solving the equation q a = Ka for the exponent a must be ’hard’;
the task of computing this exponent is called the discrete logarithm problem:
Definition 3 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Let G be a group and let α ∈ G. Suppose that
β is in < α >, the cyclic subgroup generated by α. Then there exists an exponent l, unique
up to the order of α, satisfying β = αl . If one is given α and β, the task of computing l is
called the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).
The discrete logarithm problem in a general group G is algorithmically ’hard’, which is to
N
say that the best known algorithms for computing the exponent run in time O(2 2 ), where
N is the number of bits necessary to encode an element of G on a computer [5]; typically,
3

N = log2 (|G|). There are, however, certain groups whose properties yield algorithms that
N
run faster than O(2 2 ). For example, the index calculus algorithm can solve the DLP in the
multiplicative group of certain finite fields in subexponential time[5].
Another choice of platform groups would be the general linear GL(F ) group over some
finite field F ; however, [4] provides a polynomial-time reduction of this protocol to the
discrete logarithm over several finite fields, making this approach less efficient than discrete
logarithms over finite fields. Perhaps the most popular choice of groups for DLP-based
protocols is G = E, where E is an elliptic curve. We will not discuss such protocols nor
algorithms for their solution here.
There also exist key agreement protocols that are not based on the DLP. One such protocol relies on the difficulty of the conjugacy search problem, which is the task of computing
a group element x satisfying xgx−1 , assuming that one is given y = xgx−1 and g. In some
groups, such as the general linear group, this protocol offers minimal security, since linear
algebraic techniques easily give solutions to these types of equations. In other platform
groups, however, it is difficult to solve this problem. There is also the word equivalency problem, which is to decide when two words a1 a2 a3 ...an and b1 b2 b3 ...bk in a group presentation
are equivalent. Both the conjugacy search problem and the word equivalency problem have
been employed and analyzed in a number of situations; [6] contains a good overview of these
implementations and analyses.
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Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis Key Agreement Protocol (STRKAP)

We now turn to a modification of the DLP over matrix groups that was proposed by
Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis in 2007 [2]. While the DLP alone over the matrix group offers little additional security, the proposed protocol combines the DLP with the
conjugacy search problem in the general linear group. It goes as follows:
1. Alice chooses an infinite, non-commutative group Γ, a field F , a representation ρ :
Γ → GLd (F ). In Γ, Alice also chooses two commuting subgroups G1 and G2 , which
are mapped A = ρ(G1 ) and B = ρ(G2 ). Note that it is not necessary for F to be a
finite field. All of this information is public.
2. Alice chooses an element q ∈ Γ and a vector a ∈ F d and publishes these as public
information.
3. To create her public key, Alice chooses a private element α ∈ G1 and an integer j. She
computes ρ(α· q· α−1 ) = AQA−1 and then raises this to the j th power. This matrix
Ka = AQj A−1 becomes her public key.
4. Bob now creates his public key by choosing β ∈ G2 and an integer s; his key will be
Kb = BQs B −1 , where B = ρ(β).
5. Alice computes the matrix K = (AKb A−1 )j = A(BQs B −1 )j A−1 = (AB)Qsj (AB)−1 ;
Bob can compute the same matrix via Ka .
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6. Each party can now compute the session key, which is Ka ∈ F d .
The protocol is summarized in Table 1:
Alice’s Private Data
A
j

Public Data
Q, ρ, Fpk
A, B
AQj A−1
BQs B −1

Bob’s Private Data
B
s

Table 1: Key = ((AB)Qs+j (AB)−1 )a
According to this protocol, the number of bits in the key, N , is given by N = d log2 (pk ),
since the key is a vector in (Fpk )d . In the original publication of the key agreement protocol,
several additional recommendations were made. First, the authors suggest using F2k as the
field because it is easy to implement on a computer. Additionally, the authors suggest using
an irreducible representation ρ, or at least a representation in which the matrix ρ(q) = Q
is irreducible; the assumption is that if Q has invariant subspaces then the protocol can be
reduced to the DLP over multiplicative groups of finite fields. We shall address this final
assumption in the next section.

5

Analysis

To begin our analysis of the STRKAP, we look at matrix properties which are invariant
under conjugation, and the first (and most promising) is the collection of eigenvalues. We
know that, for a general matrix Q having eigenvalues {λ1 , λ2 , ..., λk }, the eigenvalues of
AQA−1 are {λ1 , λ2 , ..., λk } when A is a non-singular matrix, and that the eigenvalues of Qj
are {λj1 , λj2 , ..., λjk }. Since the eigenvalues of Q are the roots of its characteristic polynomial
c(x) ∈ Fpk [x], we have that each of the eigenvalues are elements of a finite field; in the case
of the STRKAP, we know that these roots are in Fpkd , since Q is irreducible. Ideally, then,
we can imitate the algorithm given in [4] to reduce to a DLP over the finite field Fpkd . Yet
an example (given in the appendix) shows that an attempt to apply this algorithm to the
STRKAP not only fails to work, but it may actually return an incorrect value that could
easily be mistaken for the correct solution!
The reason that such algorithms do not work is that the conjugation by A induces a
permutation of the eigenvalues, and so when we attempt to match eigenvalues of Q to
eigenvalues of AQj A−1 , we are not guaranteed that the ’first’ eigenvalue of Q corresponds
to the ’first’ eigenvalue of AQj A−1 . The algorithm used in [4] was never intended to address
such permutations, since it relies on the fact that the same matrix can put both Q and Qj
into a block-diagonal form with the eigenvalues on the diagonal.
Because of the permutations induced by A, there is also no particular need to have Q be
irreducible, since lower-dimension invariant subspaces will be permuted, and if d is sufficiently
large and the dimension of each of these subspaces are relatively similar (ideally, all will have
exactly the same dimension), it would be just as difficult to sort out the permutations as in
the irreducible case.
5

6

Trial Exponentiation

We may begin by naı̈vely computing sequential powers of Q in an effort to find j, and in fact
this approach reveals why the key must be the vector Ka ∈ (Fpk )d rather than the matrix
K. First, we present the algorithm:
1. For i = 1, 2, ...|Q|
[a.] Compute the ith power of Q = Q · Qi−1
[b.] Solve the matrix equation XQi X −1 = AQj A−1 and Y Qi Y −1 = BQs B −1 for
solution pairs (iX , X) and (iY , Y )
[c.] Check if any solutions X commute with Bob’s subgroup; check if any solutions
Y commute with Alice’s subgroup.
[d.] Once a valid X or a valid Y has been found, continue the algorithm only for
the other unknown matrix, and iterate until both solution pairs have been found.
There are several things that must be noted about the above algorithm. First, note that
once we obtain pairs (iX , X) and (iY , Y ) such that XQiX X −1 = AQj A−1 and Y QiY Y −1 =
BQs B −1 , we can form the key as K = BAQjs (BA)−1 = B(AQj A−1 )s B −1 = B(XQiX X −1 )s B −1 =
X(BQs B −1 )iX X −1 = X(Y QiY Y −1 )iX X −1 = XY QiX iY Y −1 X −1 .
There also arises the question of how to perform the commutivity checks in step 1c; it
turns out that it is unnecessary to perform the commutivity checks on the whole of A or B
(which would result in a complexity polynomial in the order of these two groups); rather, we
can perform the commutivity checks on the generators of these groups. For the remainder
of this paper, we will let γ be the sum of the number of generators of A and the number
of generators of B. Step 1c, then, takes O(γ) steps per solution X or Y . Since the solution
space to a linear equation of the form JX = XM is of dimension d [3], we will have at most
O(dγ) commutivity checks.
The only remaining question is how big |Q| can possibly be. For this, we utilize the fact
that Q is irreducible to realize that it has all of its eigenvalues in Fpkd . With this in mind,
we can obtain two order bounds of Q.
First, let J be a Jordan block for Q, whereby J = λI + S, where λ ∈ Fpkd , I is the d × d
identity matrix, and S is the matrix with 1’s on the first superdiagonal
P and zero’s elsewhere.
Then by the binomial theorem, we have that J k = (λI + S)k = kr=0 kr λr IS k−r . Now,
n
whenever we raise J to a power of p, we have that pr = 0 for all r 6= 0, pn , since the field
Fpkd has characteristic p. Therefore, J p = λp I + λ0 S p .
Letting pd be the first power of p that is greater than d, we have that S pd is the zero matrix,
and hence J pd is the diagonal matrix with λpd on the diagonals. Since λ ∈ Fpkd −{0}, we have
k
kd
that (λpd )p d−1 = 1. Finally, we will have that (J pd )p −1 is the identity matrix. Since this
kd
happens regardless of which Jordan block we choose for Q, we are guaranteed that (Qpd )p −1
is the identity matrix. Therefore, if we have an algorithm that checks every power of Q, it
will have at most (pd )(pkd − 1) iterations.
Now if pd = p, then we will iterate the outermost look at most pkd+1 − p times, giving an
overall complexity estimate of O(pkd+1 (f (N ) + d2 γ)), where f (N ) is a polynomial function
6

in the number of bits N that accounts for the miscellaneous linear algebra step 1b. Since
1
N = d log2 (pk ), we have that this complexity is O(γ2N ( kd +1) ).
If, however, pd ≥ p2 , then we know that p < d and that p1 pd ≤ d, so that pd ≤ d2 . In
this case, then, we iterate the outermost loop at most d2 (pkd − 1) times, giving an overall
complexity estimate of O(d2 γ2N ) = O(γ2N ).
After all of this work, it appears that we have only found an exponential, and therefore
useless, algorithm. But there are many insights to gain from this algorithm. First, the
presence of γ in the complexity estimate is very unsettling, for there is no way to know how
large this could be. Even if γ is subexponential, this naı̈ve method is highly inefficient, since
N
generic algorithms can obtain complexity estimates as low as O(2 2 ), which is lower than
our algorithm in the case that p > d. However, if:
- the STRKAP protocol were keyed on the matrix K rather than the vector Ka
- γ is subexponential in N
- pd ≥ p2 , whereby pd ≤ d2 ,
then the cryptanalysis would give a different result: with K as the key, N = d2 log2 (pk ),
N
whereby we obtain a complexity estimate of O(γ2 d ), and thus for d > 2 we would have an
N
algorithm that runs faster than O(2 2 ), which is the time for generic algorithms [5].
In all, this naı̈ve approach remains unsettling. To determine γ we must know something
on the order of commuting subgroups of GL(F ); new research in commuting matrices that
may help provide further information can be found in [1]. What this approach does illustrate,
however, is how changing the key that a protocol generates may make a significant difference
in the complexity estimate of a proposed cryptanalysis, just as did the difference between
taking Ka and K as the keys in this protocol.
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Another Partial Algorithm

Since the matrices A and B are the only things preventing us from using the algorithm in
[4] to decode the STRKAP, it seems reasonable to attempt to remove these first. In the case
that Q has a complete set of eigenvectors, we might be able to solve for the matrix A as
follows:
Since Q has a complete set of eigenvalues, it must also have a complete set of nonzero
eigenvectors {v1 , v2 , ..., vd } that form a basis for the space (Fpkd )d . Likewise, we know that
AQj A−1 has a complete set of nonzero eigenvectors {w1 , w2 , ..., wd }. We know further that
the eigenvectors for Qj are precisely those of Q, for Q has a complete set of eigenvectors and
Qj vi = λji vi for all i ∈ [d].
To be an eigenvector of AQj A−1 is to say that AQj A−1 wi = γwi (where γ is the j th
power of some eigenvalue of Q). This is to say that Qj (A−1 wi ) = γ(A−1 wi ), hence A−1 wi
is an eigenvalue of Qj . But as was mentioned above, we have that the eigenvectors of Qj
are eigenvectors of Q, hence A−1 wi = cσ(i) vσ(i) , where σ is a permutation of [d] and cσ(i) is
in Fpkd . Equivalently, we have that cσ(i) Avσ(i) = wi . The constant cσ(i) is present because A
may scale vectors; the permutation σ is present because A may also permute these vectors.
We now define several matrices:
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|

|

|



V = vσ(1) vσ(2) ... vσ(d) 
|
|
|


c1 0 0 ... 0
 0 c2 0 ... 0 


C =  .. .. . .
.. 
. .
.
.
0 0 0 ... cd
and

|
|
|
W = w1 w2 ... wd 
|
|
|


Note that the matrices V and W are invertible, for their columns form a basis of the vector
space. If we let P be the permutation matrix corresponding to (σ)−1 , then we have that
A−1 W = V CP , i.e. A = V −1 C −1 P −1 W = A; letting X be the matrix C −1 P −1 , we have the
matrix equation A = V −1 XW .
Now this matrix equation has two unknown matrices, A and X, and so in general is not
helpful in computing A. However, we know that in the STRKAP, A commutes with elements
of Bob’s subgroup. By choosing any matrix B from this subgroup, we obtain that AB = BA,
i.e. (V −1 XW )B = B(V −1 XW ). Letting J = V BV −1 and M = W B −1 W −1 , we obtain the
equation JX = XM ; since we know J and M , we can solve this matrix equation using linear
algebra techniques to come up with a class of matrices satisfying this equation. We know
that at least one such solution, namely C −1 P −1 must exist; however, there is no guarantee
that this solution is unique; in fact, there will necessarily be more than one solution to this
equation since J and M have the same eigenvalues [3]. Therefore, the only time that this
algorithm will work is when there is only one solution (up to a constant multiple in Fpkd ) of
the form C −1 P −1 .
If such a solution X exists, we can compute A = V −1 XW and reduce to the DLP in
the cyclic group generated by Q without worrying about the possibility of eigenspaces being
permuted. Moreover, since all of these eigenvalues are found in Fpkd , the reduction is to a
single discrete logarithm problem in this finite field.
We summarize the algorithm as follows:
1. Obtain the eigenvalues of Q and AQj A−1 :
[a.] Compute the characteristic polynomials of Q and AQj A−1
[b.] Factor these over the field Fpkd
2. Compute the corresponding eigenvectors of Q and AQj A−1
3. Arrange these eigenvectors into arrays V and W and compute A = W XV −1 by solving
the equation JX = XM
4. Compute the discrete logarithm of Qj base Q
8

This algorithm has the potential to be a polynomial time reduction, though several things
must be considered. The factorization of polynomials over finite fields runs (at best) in
probabilistic polynomial time (see [7] for an overview of algorithms for factoring polynomials
over finite fields) rather than in true polynomial time. The remaining steps of the algorithm
do run in time that is polynomial in d, k, and log2 (p) (since most of these are simple
linear algebra algorithms), and hence in all, when there is a unique family of solutions to
JX = XM of the form kC∗−1 P∗−1 (where C∗ is an arbitrary invertible matrix with zeros
on all off-diagonals and P∗ is an arbitrary permutation matrix), the reduction occurs in
probabilistic polynomial time, whereby solving the STRKAP can be reduced to solving the
DLP over the field Fpkd .
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Conclusions and Future Research

It appears that the traditional approaches to attacking protocols over matrix groups are
ineffective in the STRKAP due to the conjugating matrices A and B. Attempting to avoid
these matrices by solving the DLP over the eigenvalues can, in some cases, lead to erroneous
results, as the example in the appendix shows. Using eigenvectors to deduce information
about A and B also seems to be a difficult approach because of the potential stretching and
permuting induced by A and B.
Still, there are more avenues to try and more techniques to employ. For example, the
action of < Q > on (Fpk )d by left multiplication induces a partition, while the action of
< AQj A−1 > on the same space yields a different partition, and it is possible that by
studying these partitions that one can conclude enough information about A to reduce the
problem to the DLP over the base field. Alternatively, there are other linear algebraic
techniques that may be employed, such as using the characteristic polynomials of Q and
AQj A−1 to deduce information about j.
Mathematical cryptology continues to be dynamic and challenging field. New key agreement protocols are being published frequently, as are new algorithms for decoding current
protocols. These algorithms often utilize deep results from algebra and number theory, and
may also help generate new ideas in these fields. Perhaps one of the most significant threat to
current cryptographic protocols is the development of quantum computing; with the ability
to simultaneously compute every power of a group element, key agreement protocols based
on the discrete logarithm problem become very insecure. No one knows when, or even if,
such computers will become feasible on the scale needed to disrupt modern communication.
Until such systems become available, protocols such as the STRKAP will continue to provide
the safest method of communication.
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Appendix
We will attempt to use the algorithm given in [4] to reduce the matrix DLP to the finite field
DLP, and by example will show that these algorithms do not work with the STRKAP. To
simplify matters, we will drop the requirement that the representation be irreducible; this
cleans up the example a great deal, and should not affect the validity of the counterexample.
Rather than constructing the infinite abelian group Γ and a representation into GLd (Fpk ),
we will simply take a matrix Q ∈ GLd (Fpk ). Let p = 11 and k = 1, and let us consider the
matrix


7 0 0 0
 0 2 0 0

Q=
 0 0 6 0
0 0 0 8
in GLd (F11 ). Let us take Alice’s exponent to

8

0
Q9 = 
0
0

be a = 9:

0 0 0
6 0 0

0 2 0
0 0 7

Further, take the matrix A to be

0
0
A=
1
0

1
0
0
0

0
0
0
1


0
1

0
0

which is simply a permutation matrix. Then the conjugate matrix H = AQ9 A−1 is given:


6 0 0 0
0 7 0 0

H = AQ9 A−1 = 
0 0 8 0
0 0 0 2
This is the matrix that Alice publishes. We now apply the algorithm presented in [4] in an
attempt to find the exponent.
Let I be the d × d identity matrix. We first choose one of the eigenvalues of Q and
a corresponding eigenvector; so choose the eigenvalue 7, and its corresponding eigenvector
[1, 0, 0, 0]⊺ and take the matrix having this vector as its first column to be the identity
matrix. Then the (1, 1) entry q1,1 of I Q I has as its ath power the (1, 1) entry h1,1 of I H I,
a
. In our case, we find then that 6 = 7a , which gives that a ∼
i.e h1,1 = q1,1
= 7 (mod 10).
Repeating this for all eigenvalues, we find that a must equal 7, but in fact it is 9! Thus, this
algorithm will give the incorrect answer, and moreover it will not notice that its output is
incorrect!
Of course, this and similar algorithms were never meant to work on the STRKAP sort
of protocol, so it is no surprise that they fail to give the correct value. The problem arises
10

because the conjugation can easily permute the order of the eigenvalues of Q, and therefore it
becomes difficult to ’undo’ this permutation without knowing A, and when Q has a complete
set of eigenvalues which are all generators, it is truly impossible to use this protocol, as the
above example shows.
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